Abstract-The Goppa Code Distinguishing (GD) problem consists in distinguishing the matrix of a Goppa code from a random matrix. The hardness of this problem is an assumption to prove the security of code-based cryptographic primitives such as McEliece's cryptosystem. Up to now, it is widely believed that the GD problem is a hard decision problem. We present the first method allowing to distinguish alternant and Goppa codes over any field. Our technique can solve the GD problem in polynomial time provided that the codes have sufficiently large rates. The key ingredient is an algebraic characterization of the key-recovery problem. The idea is to consider the rank of a linear system which is obtained by linearizing a particular polynomial system describing a key-recovery attack. It appears that this dimension depends on the type of code considered. Explicit formulas derived from extensive experimentations for the rank are provided for "generic" random, alternant, and Goppa codes over any field. Finally, we give theoretical explanations of these formulas in the case of random codes, alternant codes over any field of characteristic two and binary Goppa codes.
the claim that inverting the encryption function, and in particular recovering the private key from public data, is intractable. The classical methods for inverting the McEliece encryption function without finding a trapdoor all resort to the use of the best general decoding algorithms [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . All these algorithms, whose time complexity is exponential (in the length), attempt to solve the long-standing problem of decoding random linear code [12] . They also assume (implicitly or explicitly) that there does not exist an algorithm that is able to decode more efficiently McEliece public keys. Note that if ever such an algorithm exists, it would permit to solve the GD problem.
On the other hand, no significant breakthrough has been observed with respect to the problem of recovering the private key [13] , [14] . This has led to state that the generator matrix of a binary Goppa code does not disclose any visible structure that an attacker could exploit. This is strengthened by the fact that Goppa codes share many characteristics with random codes. For instance, they asymptotically meet the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. They also have a trivial permutation group, etc. Hence, the hardness of the GD problem has become a classical belief, and as a consequence, a de facto assumption to prove the semantic security in the standard model (IND-CPA in [15] and IND-CCA2 in [16] ), and the security in the random oracle model against existential forgery [2] , [17] of the signature scheme [2] .
We present a deterministic polynomial-time distinguisher for codes whose rate is close to 1. This includes in particular codes encountered with the signature scheme CFS ( [2] , [18] ). We emphasize that our method can distinguish codes also used in McEliece's encryption scheme. For instance, the binary Goppa code obtained with and corresponding to a 90-bit security key is distinguishable. We provide an asymptotic formula for the smallest rate for which one can distinguish a -random code from a -ary alternant or Goppa code (Theorem 3). If is fixed and assuming that the length is then when tends to infinity, we have where all logarithms are taken to base 2. Our distinguisher is based on the algebraic attack developed against compact variants of McEliece [19] . In this approach, the key-recovery problem is transformed into the one of solving an algebraic system. By using a linearization technique, we are able to derive a linear system whose rank is different from what one would expect in the random case. More precisely, we observe experimentally that this defect in the rank is directly related to the type of codes. We provide explicit formulas for "generic" 0018-9448 © 2013 IEEE random, alternant, and Goppa codes over any alphabet. We performed extensive experiments to confirm that the formulas are accurate. Eventually, we prove the formula in the random case and give explanations in the case of alternant codes over any field of characteristic two and binary Goppa codes.
However, the existence of our distinguisher does not undermine the security of primitives based on Goppa codes, but basically, it proves that the GD assumption is false for some parameters, and consequently should be used with great care as an assumption for a security reduction.
The paper is organized as follows. After recalling basic notions in coding-theory in Section II, we introduce in Section III our algebraic distinguisher which is basically the dimension of the solution space of a linear system that is deduced by linearization from the algebraic system that any McEliece cryptosystem must satisfy. We then provide explicit formulas that predict the behavior of the distinguisher coming from experiments. In Sections IV and V, we give explanations of the formulas for alternant and binary Goppa codes. In Section VI, we give a proof of its typical behavior in the random case. Lastly, we conclude over the cryptographic implications the distinguisher induces and we deduce an asymptotic formula for the smallest rate for which we can distinguish a random code from an alternant code or a Goppa code.
II. CODE-BASED PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
The problem of decoding random linear codes is a potential candidate for building public-key cryptographic primitives such as an encryption scheme. McEliece [3] was the first to use this problem in public-key cryptography. The idea is to start from a family of codes equipped with a polynomial-time decoding algorithm. The fundamental concept is to consider two equivalent representations of a code: one should facilitate the decoding, whereas the decoding should be infeasible from the other one. Although his design principle is general, he explicitly advocated to use binary Goppa codes [20] .
A. Coding Theory Background
Code-based public-key cryptography focuses on linear codes that have a polynomial time decoding algorithm. We recall that a -ary (linear) code C over the finite field of elements defined by a matrix (with ) whose entries belong to is the vector space spanned by its rows, i.e.,
C
The length of C is and its rate is the ratio . The role of decoding algorithms is to correct errors of prescribed weight. We say that a decoding algorithm corrects errors if it recovers from the knowledge of for all possible of weight at most .
One famous family of codes is the one of binary Goppa codes. It belongs to the more general class of alternant codes ([21, Ch. 12, p. 365]). The main well-known feature of an alternant code is the possibility of being decoded in polynomial time. It is more convenient to describe this class through a parity-check matrix over an extension field of over which the code is defined. We recall that a parity-check matrix of a -ary code C is defined as a matrix such that 
B. Cryptographic Primitives Based on Binary Goppa Codes
The two most important public schemes that use binary Goppa codes are McEliece's encryption function and Cour-tois-Finiasz-Sendrier (CFS) [2] signature algorithm. We briefly recall here the general principle of McEliece's scheme. The key generation algorithm picks at random one generator matrix of a randomly picked binary Goppa code of G of degree . The secret key is the decoding algorithm associated with G and the public key is . To encrypt , the sender has to choose a random vector in of weight and computes the ciphertext . The receiver then recovers the plaintext by applying on .
The CFS scheme also relies on binary Goppa codes. A user whose public key is and who wishes to sign a message has to compute a string such that the Hamming weight of is at most . Anyone (a verifier) can publicly check the validity of a signature. Unfortunately, this approach can only provide signatures for messages that are within distance from a codeword . The CFS scheme prompts to modify the message by appending a counter incremented until the decoding algorithm can find such a signature. The efficiency of this scheme heavily depends on the number of trials. With a binary Goppa codes of length and dimension , the number of trials is of order . So one has to choose a very small and therefore take a very large in order to be secure. The code rate is then equal to which is quite close to 1 for large (that is for large values of ) and moderate values of . For instance, a 80-bit security CFS scheme requires to take and whereas the McEliece cryptosystem for the same security needs to choose and ( [18] ). Thus, one major difference between the McEliece cryptosystem and the CFS scheme lies in the choice of the parameters of the codes.
C. Goppa Code Distinguishing (GD) Problem
The minimum requirement for an encryption function is that it should be infeasible from a given ciphertext and public data 1 like the public key, ciphertexts, etc., to recover the corresponding plaintext . This issue is directly linked to the following computational problem.
Definition 3 (McEliece Problem):
Let be a generator matrix of a binary Goppa code of length and dimension where and are positive integers. Let be a vector from and let be a vector from of weight . Finally, we set . Then, the McEliece Problem asks to find and only from and .
One obvious way of solving this problem consists in devising a method that recovers the private key. But, it is also possible to recover a plaintext from a specific ciphertext without resorting to a key-recovery attack. In particular, an attacker against the McEliece scheme would find the plaintext by applying general decoding methods like [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] , [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] A classical stance is to claim that binary Goppa codes look like random linear codes. It amounts to say that there does not exist a polynomial-time computable quantity which behaves differently depending on whether the code is a Goppa or a random code. Currently, it is an open problem to establish a formal proof that would substantiate the claim that a binary Goppa code is indistinguishable from a random code. This assumption is attractive because it enables to rely on the hardness of decoding a random linear code to prove the security of the McEliece function. This reasoning does make sense because binary Goppa codes share several common aspects 2 with a randomly picked linear code. Furthermore, all the general decoding algorithms do not exploit the information, even partially, that a matrix describes a "hidden" Goppa code. Based on this, the Courtois et al. [2] defined the Goppa Code Distinguishing (GD) problem and stated that classification issues are in the core of coding theory since its emergence in 1950s. So far nothing significant is known about Goppa codes, more precisely there is no known property invariant by permutation and computable in polynomial time which characterizes Goppa codes. Finding such a property or proving that none exists would be an important breakthrough in coding theory and would also probably seal the fate, for good or ill, of Goppa code-based cryptosystems.
We state now precisely the GD problem. An algorithm is a -distinguisher if it runs in time at most and such that There is simple way to construct a distinguisher from an attacker -attacker against the McEliece cryptosystem. We denote it by and it works as follows. On a given input , it randomly picks a couple among and then outputs if and otherwise. The running time of is therefore upper-bounded by the running time of and its advantage is then equal to [28] This shows that if ) is very small (or negligible) then the chances that an attacker recovers a plaintext are also very small provided that the problem of decoding a random linear code is hard. So the difficulty of the GD problem guarantees that there is no polynomial-time algorithm that solves the McEliece problem.
Until our recent work in [1] and this paper, the only known algorithm for solving GD enumerates binary Goppa codes and tests the code equivalence thanks to the support splitting algorithm [29] . This approach runs in time for binary Goppa codes of degree and length with . Another possible approach was proposed in [30] which shows that quantum Fourier sampling (QFS) can also be used for solving the GD problem. However, it turns out that QFS has a negligible advantage against the GD problem. Thus, GD problem seems immune against QFS unlike classical cryptographic problems such as factoring integers and discrete logarithms which can be solved in (quantum) polytime thanks to QFS [31] . This does not contradict the existence of a (classical) poly-time algorithm solving GD. In this paper, we show how to exploit the algebraic structure of Goppa codes to construct a classical polytime distinguisher with optimal advantage under some conditions on the rate of the code.
D. Semantically Secure Conversions
The fundamental issue when dealing with cryptographic primitives is to prove its security. A first approach is to show that the primitive resists to the best-known attacks. However, this does not guarantee that there will not appear one day a better attack that renders the primitive insecure. The methodology of security proof by reduction addresses this question by linking a security notion that a cryptographic primitive should verify to an algorithmic problem widely considered as hard. The approach is similar to the one that proves the NP-completeness of a given problem. Such a "security proof" proves that if an attacker exists then it can be used as a subroutine to solve a hard problem. In other words, such an attacker has little chances to exist.
These simple facts prompt to design conversions that would lead to an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme. The first article to propose such a conversion for the McEliece cryptosystem is [32] which proposes a conversion resulting into an IND-CCA2 in the random oracle model under the assumption that the problem of decoding random linear codes is difficult. This work was then followed by [33] which proposes another modification while providing an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme in the standard model 3 under the assumptions that both decoding random linear codes and distinguishing Goppa codes are difficult problems. Finally, under the same assumptions, [34] proposed (a modified) McEliece cryptosystem that is IND-CCA2 in the standard model.
III. DISTINGUISHER OF ALTERNANT AND GOPPA CODES
The McEliece cryptosystem relies on binary Goppa codes which belong to the class of alternant codes. We are now able to construct an algebraic system as explained in [19] for a key-recovery. This algebraic system will be the main ingredient for building a distinguisher. We assume that the public matrix is a generator matrix where by assumption and such that it defines an alternant code of degree . We know that the knowledge of a matrix for some vectors and allows to efficiently decode the public code defined by . Furthermore, from the definition of , we also know Let and be variables corresponding to the s and the s. Observe that such s and s are a particular solution [19] of the following polynomial system: (2) where the s are the entries of the known matrix . Clearly, solving this system would lead to a possibly equivalent private key. For compact variants [35] , [36] of McEliece [3] , additional structures permit to drastically reduce the number of variables allowing to solve (2) for a large set of parameters in polynomial-time using dedicated Gröbner bases techniques [19] . But the general case is currently a major open question. However, we describe a simple way for partially solving (2). It basically consists in deriving a linear system from the polynomial system (2) . Note that this operation is actually the first step performed during the computation of Gröbner bases algorithms such as by or [37] , [38] . From now on, we will always assume that with . We can assume that with and is in reduced row echelon form over its first positions where for and is the submatrix of formed by its last columns. Next, for any and , we can rewrite (2) as . Then, thanks to the trivial identity for all in , we obtain
We thus obtain a linear system of equations involving variables which is as follows:
. . .
Definition 6: For any integer and , the number of variables in the linear system as defined in (3) is denoted by and its rank by . We denote by the kernel of and its dimension as a -vector space is denoted by .
Let us recall that is necessarily a -vector space since the linear system (3) have coefficients in but the solutions of (2) are sought in the extension field . Furthermore, we obviously have . Hence, in order to recover the solutions of (2), it is necessary that is almost equal to the number of variables . For a random system, this is likely to happen when the number of equations in (3) is greater than the number of unknowns, that is to say . It appears experimentally that is amazingly large even in the case where . It even depends on whether or not the code with generator matrix is chosen as a (generic) alternant code or as a Goppa code. Interestingly enough, when is chosen at random, is equal to with very high probability. In particular, the dimension of the solution space is typically 0 when is larger than the number of variables as one would expect. This will be proved in Section VI. Although this defect in the rank is an obstacle to break the McEliece cryptosystem, it can be used to distinguish the public generator of a structured code from a random code.
We consider three cases. First, when the s are chosen uniformly and independently at random in then we denote by the dimension of . When is chosen as a generator matrix of a random alternant (respectively, Goppa) code of degree , we denote it by (respectively, ). We carried out intensive computations with Magma [39] by randomly generating alternant and Goppa codes over the field with for in the range and several values of . Furthermore, in our probabilistic model, a random alternant code is obtained by picking uniformly and independently at random two vectors and from such that the s are all different and the s are all nonzero. A random Goppa code is obtained by taking a random vector in with all the s different and a random irreducible polynomial of degree . Our experiments have revealed that the dimension of is predictable and follows formulas.
Experimental Fact 1 (Alternant Case): As long as , is equal with high probability to (4) with .
Experimental Fact 2 (Goppa Case): As long as then is equal with high probability to which is defined when as (5) and when :
with being the unique integer such that
We gathered in Appendix A some experimental results obtained through intensive computations with the Magma system [39] .
IV. ALTERNANT CASE
The goal of this section is to explain the value of the dimension of for -ary alternant codes of degree . We shall see that this dimension will be obtained by first identifying a -basis of when viewed as a linear system with coefficients in . To set up the linear system as defined in (3), we have used the trivial identity . The fundamental remark is that we can use any identity with such that . Such identities lead to the same algebraic system :
where we have set
The fact that there are many different ways of combining equations together yielding the same linear system explains why the dimension of is large. In what follows, we exhibit further elements of thanks to the automorphisms where is in . Indeed, we can also consider the identity (8) for any integers , and such that . We get again the linear system . However, assuming that , solutions obtained from such equations are exactly those coming from the identity (9) We can focus on vectors that satisfy equations obtained with , , and . Without loss of generality, we can assume that and let us set . Moreover, the equality implies that . We now try to determine the number of linearly independent solutions induced by such identities. For 
V. BINARY GOPPA CASE
In this section, we will investigate the case of binary Goppa codes. Notice that for -ary Goppa codes of degree we have observed that because (4) simplifies to This is due to the fact that when . We leave as an open question the proof that -ary Goppa codes of degree behave for our distinguisher as alternant codes. We focus on the classical case in code-based cryptography of binary Goppa codes.
The goal is to identify a basis of for binary Goppa codes of degree . We assume therefore that . In that special case, the theoretical expression (Experimental Fact 2) has a simpler expression.
Proposition 3: Let . When , then (6) can be simplified to Theorem 1 shows that a binary Goppa code of degree can be regarded as a binary alternant code of degree . This seems to indicate that we should have This is not the case though because it turns out that is significantly smaller than this. In our experiments, we have found out that the vectors of still form a generating set for . Unfortunately, they are not independent anymore. Our goal is therefore to identify the additional dependencies occurring in . We will see that many of them come from -relations induced by the Goppa polynomial with . Recall that by definition . This fact will allow to derive two types of linear dependencies. The first type of linear relations is rather natural, while the second type is more subtle. In the sequel, we set .
A. Linear Dependencies Over
We derive a first set of linear dependencies induced by the Goppa polynomial . Proposition 4: Let , and be such that , and then it holds (11) Proof: Let us set as the following:
The equality clearly implies that and therefore One can check that is exactly the vector that we would obtain from the identity with and . Hence, by (10) 
We recognize that is exactly the expression of and hence the proposition is proved. We can count the number of linearly dependencies predicted by Proposition 5. Let be the number of vectors of satisfying (13) . By Proposition 5, is exactly the number of so that (15) 
C. Counting the Exact Number of Linear Dependencies Over
We now want to count the number of linear dependencies induced by Propositions 5 and 4. The difficulty is that some of the vectors of are counted twice because they appear both in linear relations of the form (11) and "quadratic" equations of the form (13) . Let be the number of such vectors. More precisely, let be the subset of vectors of which are involved in an equation of type (13) . Remark in that case has to be even and . Furthermore, there are equations of type (11) 
VI. RANDOM CASE
The purpose of this section is to study the behavior of , namely the dimension of as -vector space when the entries of the matrix are drawn independently from the uniform distribution over . In this case, we can show that Theorem 2: Assume that and that the entries of are drawn independently from the uniform distribution over . Then, for any function tending to infinity as goes to infinity, we have as goes to infinity. Notice that if we choose for instance, then asymptotically the dimension of the solution space is with very large probability smaller than . When and are of the same order (which is generally chosen in practice) this quantity is smaller than or which are of the form . The main ingredient for proving Theorem 2 consists in analyzing a certain (partial) Gaussian elimination process on the matrix
We can see the matrix in block form, each block consists of the matrix Each block is of size . Notice that in , the rows for which consist only of zeros. To start the Gaussian elimination process with , we will therefore choose rows for which . This gives a square matrix . We perform Gaussian elimination on by adding rows involved in to put the first block in standard form. We continue this process with by picking now rows which have not been chosen before and which correspond to . This yields a square submatrix of size and we continue this process until we reach the last block. The key observation is that A rough analysis of this process yields Theorem 2. The important point is that what happens for different blocks are independent processes and it corresponds to looking at different rows of the matrix . We give all the previous results that we need in order to prove Theorem 2.
It will be convenient to assume that the columns of are ordered lexicographically. The index of the first column is , the second one is , while the last one is . The matrices 's which are involved in the Gaussian elimination process mentioned above are defined inductively as follows. Let be the subset of of indices such that . Let be the subset of formed by its first elements (if these elements exist). Now, we set (19) Let be the rank of . To simplify the discussion, we assume that 1) .
2) The submatrix of formed by its first rows and columns is of full rank. Note that we can always assume this by performing suitable row and column permutations. In other words, has the following block structure:
We denote where is a matrix of size with only zero entries and is the identity matrix of size . Notice that takes the block form This is basically performing Gaussian elimination on in order to have the first columns in standard form. We then define inductively the , and as follows:
is the submatrix of obtained from the rows in and the columns associated with the indices of the form where ranges from to . is obtained from by first choosing a square submatrix of of full rank and with the same rank as and then by performing Gaussian elimination on the rows in order to put the columns of involved in in standard form (i.e., the submatrix of corresponding to becomes the identity matrix while the other entries in the columns involved in become zero Proof: Let . Using Markov's inequality (20) for some well chosen . The exponential moment appearing at the numerator is upper-bounded with the help of the previous lemma and by using the independence of the random variables i.e.,
Using now (21) in (20), we obtain which implies
We choose to minimize this upper-bound leading to
The last ingredient for proving Theorem 2 is a bound on the probability that is too small to construct . From this, we deduce that where is the event " " and is the event "for at least one with we have ." We use now Lemma 5 to prove that as goes to infinity. We finish the proof by noticing that the probability of the complementary set of satisfies
VII. CONCLUSION AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC IMPLICATIONS
The existence of a distinguisher for the specific case of binary Goppa codes is not valid for any value of and but tends to be true for codes that have a rate very close to one. We will elaborate on this point below. This kind of codes are mainly encountered with the signature scheme [2] . If we assume that the length is equal to and we denote by the smallest integer such that then any binary Goppa code of degree can be distinguished (see Table I ). For example, the binary Goppa code obtained with and corresponding to a 90-bit security McEliece public key is distinguishable. More interestingly, all the keys proposed in [18] for the CFS signature scheme can be distinguished.
A. Asymptotic Behavior
When the length of the code goes to infinity an asymptotic formula can be derived for the smallest rate allowing distinguish a random code from an alternant code or a Goppa code. We derive such a formula when we assume for simplicity that the cardinality of the base field is fixed and is chosen as (in practice is chosen either in this way or at least of the same order as ). We also assume that the dimension of the code satisfies . Finally, we also make the assumption that the dimensions and are given by their theoretical values and , respectively, and that the dimension of is given by . This critical rate corresponds to the smallest value of for which becomes bigger than (asymptotically there will be no difference between Goppa codes or alternant codes). It holds that We let . Our claim (whose proof is postponed in the Appendix) is that Theorem 3: Let us assume that . When is fixed and tends to infinity then and where all logarithms are taken to base 2.
In Table I , we have computed the value of for several ( is equal to 2). This shows that our approximation is rather close to computed in practice even for small values of .
B. Concluding Remarks
We emphasize that the existence of such a distinguisher does not undermine the security of McEliece [3] or CFS [2] . It only shows that the GD assumption should be used with great care. It has also been observed in [41] that the value of can be equivalently determined by considering the dimension of the square code of the dual of the public code. The square code construction relies on the componentwise product of vectors. For any vectors and , we denote it by . For a code A , we denote by A its square code which is the linear space spanned by where and describe a basis of A . If we denote by D the dual of the public TABLE II   AND   TABLE III   AND   TABLE IV AND code then it turns out [41] that D D . It should be added that this notion has been used recently to successfully attack several cryptographic schemes relying on (modified) generalized Reed-Solomon codes [42] . More generally, a natural open question is to investigate the hardness of GD for others codes having a polynomial-time decoding algorithm (for instance, LDPC, Reed-Muller, and so on).
Lastly, the recent work [30] shows that the natural reduction of GD to a hidden subgroup problem yields negligible information. As a consequence, it rules out the direct analog of a quantum attack using the so-called quantum Fourier sampling (QFS) which breaks number theoretic problems [31] . More exactly, [30] shows that QFS has a negligible advantage against GD when the rate is where . While our result is somewhat contradictory with [30] , it is interesting to observe that and the critical rate share some similarities. Tables II-XI some results obtained through intensive computations with the Magma system [39] . We randomly generated alternant and Goppa codes over the field with for values of in the range and several . The Goppa codes are generated by means of an irreducible of degree and hence has no multiple roots. In particular,
APPENDIX

A) Experimental Results: We gathered in
we can apply Theorem 1 in the binary case. We compare the dimensions of the solution space against the dimension of the system derived from a random linear code. Tables II and III give figures for the binary case with . We can check that is equal to 0 for and as expected. We remark that is different from whenever , and is different from as long as . Finally, we observe that our formulas for fit as long as which correspond to . This is also the case for binary Goppa codes since we have as long as , i.e.,
. We also give in Tables X and  XI the examples we obtained for and to check that the arguments also apply. We also compare binary Goppa codes and random linear codes for in Tables IV-VI and  in Tables VII-IX . We see that and are different for when and for they are different even beyond our range of experiment ( ).
B) Proof of Theorem 3:
To prove Theorem 3 we will first use the following observation.
Lemma 7: Let be as defined in (4) . Let also be as defined in (6) . There exists constants and (respectively, and and ) such that 
The upper bound is clear since
For the lower bound, we remark that
In addition
As a consequence . Remark that can be bounded from above by some (negative) constant. So, it holds that for some constant . Observe now that is equal to (25) The lower bound on follows immediately from this. The expression can be lower bounded (respectively, upper bounded) by a term of the form (respectively, ) for some constant (respectively, ). This holds for all positive integers . Finally, we recall that when :
and when :
The bound (23) on can be proved in the same way. From this lemma, we deduce that Lemma 8: There exist two constants and such that for every satisfying we have , it follows that any function of the form will be negative for large enough in the range . This implies that for large enough. We deduce from this fact which holds for any and from the upper bound that when goes to infinity. Finally, the proof of Theorem 3 is now obtained by remarking
